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ALLEVIATING OWN-RACE BIAS IN  
CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATIONS 
BRYAN SCOTT RYAN

 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past 80 years, courts, social scientists, and legal scholars 
have come to agree that eyewitness testimony is largely unreliable due to 
a variety of confounding factors. One prominent factor that makes 
eyewitness testimony faulty is own-race bias; individuals are generally 
better at recognizing members of their own race and tend to be highly 
inaccurate in identifying persons of other races. This instance, where a 
witness of one race attempts to identify a member of another race, is 
referred to as a cross-racial identification. Own-race bias in cross-racial 
identifications creates racial discrimination in the American judicial 
system, where a majority of defendants in criminal cases are minorities. 
Courts have traditionally ignored the problem of own-race bias in the 
courtroom, believing that traditional safeguards such as cross-
examination and summation effectively resolve racial discrimination in the 
judicial system.  
Critical race theorists, however, argue that this response not only fails 
to address own-race bias, but actually contributes to racial discrimination 
by reinforcing ordinariness–the idea that racism and racial discrimination 
are ordinary experiences, not abnormalities. In response, academics have 
proposed multiple solutions, including allowing expert testimony, issuing 
jury instructions, or eliminating eyewitness testimony altogether, to 
address the problem of own-race bias. Applying ordinariness, and 
balancing the concerns of the judiciary, the optimal solution to alleviate 
own-race bias is to issue a jury instruction. I argue, though, that the few 
cross-racial identification jury instructions that are currently in place 
have critical flaws. Applying critical race theory and, more specifically, 
ordinariness, I argue that an optimal jury instruction must be mandatory 
in all situations where a cross-racial identification has occurred, drafted 
using objective language, and issued before the identifying witness 
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testifies against the defendant and separate from the general eyewitness 
testimony jury instruction. 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial tensions are an undeniable part of America’s past, but such 
strains are far from history. Over the last eighteen months, we have seen 
racialized conflicts and social unrest arise in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten 
Island, New York; Baltimore, Maryland; Cleveland, Ohio; and Dallas, 
Texas, among others.
1
 Each of these incidents constitutes a single example 
of larger recurring national problems. Complex racial disparities exist in 
nearly every facet of American life: legally, culturally, and socially.
2
 Race 
affects each of our lives.
3
 Racism is not dead, and race-based 
 
 
 1. See The Lessons of Ferguson, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.economist. 
com/news/leaders/21613261-there-no-excuse-rioting-smarter-policing-would-make-it-less-likely-lessons; 
Ray Sanchez, Choke Hold by Cop Killed NY Man, Medical Examiner Says, CNN.COM (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/01/justice/new-york-choke-hold-death/; Oliver Laughland & Jon Swaine, 
Six Baltimore Officers Suspended Over Police-Van Death of Freddie Gray, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/20/baltimore-officers-suspended-death-freddie-
gray; Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice 
within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/; 
Kim Bellware, Cop Placed on Leave After Video Emerges of Brutal Arrests at Teen Pool Party, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/07/ mckinney-police-pool-
party_n_7530164.html.  
 2. See, e.g., John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial 
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 214 (2001) (“One in three black males between the ages of 
twenty and twenty-nine is under judicial supervision in this country. And while only five percent of the 
U.S. population, black males make up more than half of America’s prisoners.”); Catherine Hill, How 
Does Race Affect the Gender Wage Gap?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/catherine-hill/how-does-race-affect-the-gender-wage-gap_b_5087132.html (stating that African 
American women, on average, earn 12% less than white women for the same job).  
 One of the most compelling, and currently relevant thanks to the release of the New Line Cinema 
biopic Straight Outta Compton, examples of racial unrest due to perceived disparities is the 1988 
NWA song, “Fuck Tha Police.” In 1989, songwriter Ice Cube addressed the lyrics to the song, which 
discussed, rather explicitly, racial disparities perpetuated by law enforcement: “Our people been 
wanting to say, ‘Fuck the police’ for the longest time. If something happened in my neighborhood, the 
last people we’d call was the police. Our friends get killed; they never find the killer. 387 people were 
killed in gang activity in L.A. in 1988. Nothing was said about that. But when this Korean girl got 
killed in Westwood, a white neighborhood, now it’s a gang problem. As long as [black Americans] 
was killing each other, there wasn’t nothing said.” John Leland, Kick the Ballistics, SPIN, Sept. 1989, 
at 12. 
 3. See generally Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP (2015), http://www.naacp.org/pages/ 
criminal-justice-fact-sheet (discussing vast difference in incarceration rates between white and 
minority populations); Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing gaps in credibility given to eyewitnesses based on race). 
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discrimination, both intentional and unintentional, is still rampant in 
American culture.
4
 
With the express intention of changing inherently discriminatory 
systems, critical race theory studies the convergence of racial biases with 
social, political, and economic power structures.
5
 Critical race theory 
stands out from other social science fields, however, in its focus on 
individual and social narratives rather than defined factors or goals, 
allowing critical race theorists to adopt significantly varied ideologies.
6
 As 
such, it is difficult to address a singular, agreed-upon tenet of critical race 
theory. One of the few shared opinions by the majority of critical race 
theorists, though, is that racism and racial discrimination are “ordinary, not 
aberrational” experiences.
7
 This belief, referred to as “ordinariness,” 
argues that race, while generally acknowledged, is not specifically 
understood within society.
8
 Our failure to consider the specific effects of 
race makes both racism and racial discrimination, especially unintentional 
inequities, especially difficult to cure.
9
  
In contrast to ordinariness, the judiciary has consistently applied the 
theory of colorblindness—a formal legal conception of equality that 
“insists on treatment that is the same across the board.”
10
 Because 
 
 
 4. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 26 (2d 
ed. 2012) (“Some have even managed to convince themselves that with the election of Barack Obama, 
we have arrived at a post-racial stage of social development.”). As the authors note, “Studies show that 
blacks and Latinos who seek loans, apartments or jobs are much more apt than similarly qualified 
whites to suffer rejections, often for vague or spurious reasons . . . chief executive officers, senators, 
surgeons, and university presidents are almost all white. Poverty, however, has a black or brown face: 
black families command, on the average, about one-tenth of the assets of their white counterparts . . . 
People of color lead shorter lives, receive worse medical care, complete fewer years of school, and 
occupy more menial jobs than do whites.” Id. at 11–12. 
 5. Id. at 3. It is important to differentiate between racism, “a belief that race is the primary 
determinant of human capacities in fixed racial patterns of superiority and inferiority,” and race 
discrimination, “treating members of different races differently, regardless of whether racism is the 
antecedent.” Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171, 178 (1993). While the 
word “racism,” is retained in quoted material in the text, the primary focus of this Note, own-race bias, 
is an example of race discrimination.  
 6. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 7 (“[N]ot every writer would subscribe to every 
tenet set out in this [discussion of critical race theory].”). 
 7. Id. (“[R]acism is . . . ‘normal science,’ the usual way society does business, the common, 
everyday experience of most people of color in this country.”). 
 8. Id. at 8. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. The theory of colorblindness is taken from Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896), in which he stated: “in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, 
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” Id. at 1146 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan’s dissent was cited in several major cases throughout the civil 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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colorblindness does not address the differing circumstances and specific 
problems minorities face, it can “remedy only the most blatant forms of 
discrimination,” such as intentional racism.
11
 Critical race theorists have 
pontificated that colorblindness not only ignores less obvious forms of 
discrimination, but “when applied to the complexity of civil society, 
actually materializes into a disguised form of racial privileging.”
12
 
Unintentional and inconspicuous discrimination, in this manner, continues 
to disadvantage minorities.
13
  
To remedy the specific, unseen effects of racial discrimination on 
minorities, it is imperative to directly address race wherever possible.
14
 
Increased attention to discriminatory results is especially important within 
the criminal justice system, where the consequence of unintentional racial 
bias is the loss of life and liberty for a citizen of a country founded on 
those very rights. Too often, Courts have found that the complicated issues 
of racial discrimination and prejudice fall “within the ambit of jurors’ 
general knowledge and life experience.”
15
 This belief, that the general 
populace understands the complex subconscious biases and institutional 
prejudices that exist externally in our society and internally, to some 
degree, in every individual, is patently false. 
 
 
rights movement as the antithesis of affirmative action. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 287 (“Our Constitution is color-blind.”) (citing Plessy, 16 S. Ct. 1138). 
 11. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 8. The writers include as examples of blatant forms 
of discrimination caught by “colorblind” rules the decision to hire a white college dropout over a black 
Ph.D. and the targeting of Latino workers through the use of an immigration dragnet in a food-
processing plant. Id. 
 12. Harvey Gee, Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, Jury Instructions, and Justice, 11 
Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 70, 95 (2009) [hereinafter Gee, Justice] (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 13. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 27 (“[I]f racism is embedded in our thought 
processes and social structures as deeply as many [critical race theorists] believe, then the ‘ordinary 
business’ of society—the routines, practices, and institutions that we rely on to do the world’s work—
will keep minorities in subordinate positions.”). 
 14. Id. (“Only aggressive, color-conscious efforts to change the way things are will do much to 
ameliorate misery.”). 
 15. People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). See, e.g., Burgess v. United 
States, 953 A.2d 1055, 1059 n.5 (D.C. 2008) (“Interracial identification . . . [is not] beyond the ken of 
a jury to figure [out]. . . . Whether it’s white people or black people or Asians . . . lots of people 
understand that when you are making an identification across racial lines, it’s harder than within racial 
lines.”); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 463–64 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to allow expert testimony 
because difficulty in accurately identifying members of another race is a “commonsense view”). See 
also Joy L. Lindo, New Jersey Jurors Are No Longer Color-Blind Regarding Eyewitness 
Identification, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1224, 1252 (2000) (“The [Cromedy] court specifically 
disallowed expert testimony because of the widely held commonsense view that members of one race 
have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race—thus concluding that 
expert testimony on the topic would not assist the jury in any meaningful way.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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This lack of public understanding regarding intricate racial issues 
becomes clear when analyzing cross-racial identifications. Cross-racial 
identifications are a form of eyewitness testimony in which the witness 
and the identified individual are different races.
16
 Cross-racial 
identifications have been shown to be particularly unreliable due to “own-
race bias,” the unintentional tendency of individuals to less accurately 
identify members of other races. There has been significant research 
indicating that juries do not understand the science behind eyewitness 
testimony generally. It is therefore unreasonable to assume that jurors 
comprehend the sub-factors (such as own-race bias) that affect eyewitness 
accuracy in specific circumstances. Juries, as a result of their lack of 
understanding, occasionally rely on faulty testimony, leading to wrongful 
convictions.
17
 As minorities are per capita more likely to be brought into 
the courtroom as criminal defendants, wrongful convictions based entirely 
or in part on faulty cross-racial identifications almost certainly 
disproportionately affect persons of color.
18
 
According to the rationale of ordinariness, a more race-specific 
approach must be taken to correct this unintentional discrimination.
19
 This 
Note will apply the theory of ordinariness to address the fallibility of 
cross-racial identifications and assess potential solutions to alleviate own-
race bias in these situations. Critical race theorists have not directly 
addressed cross-racial identification jury instructions, thus much of this 
analysis will hypothesize how critical race theorists would react to the 
solutions and situations addressed. 
 
 
 16. See Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 294 (Md. 2005). 
 17. Juries often feel the need to convict an identified party due to a moral sense of justice. See 
Rutledge, supra note 2, at 208 (“Juries naturally want to punish [someone for] a vicious crime, [and] 
may well be unschooled in the effects that the subtle compound of suggestion, anxiety, and 
forgetfulness in the face of the need to recall often has on witnesses.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 18.  Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Regarding 
Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Aug. 
2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20 
Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (“[R]acial disparity . . . pervades the U.S. 
criminal justice system. Racial minorities are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once 
arrested, they are more likely to be convicted; and once convicted, they are more likely to face stiff 
sentences.”). See also Rutledge, supra note 2, at 212 (When viewing the issues present in cross-racial 
identification with the “belief that blacks are treated disparately in the criminal justice system, it is 
easy to see that the problem is complex and not easily allocated for or rectified.”). 
 19. Behavioral and Social Science has historical precedent in being used to support legal 
conclusions. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 463–64 (“The Court’s finding [in Brown v. Board. of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)] was not based simply on [intuition] or common-sense . . . [but] was 
attributed to . . . seven social science studies.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part I of this Note will discuss the general frailty of eyewitness 
testimony and, more specifically, cross-racial identifications. Part II will 
address the four commonly proposed solutions to alleviate the cross-racial 
misidentifications: (1) excluding eyewitness testimony entirely; (2) relying 
on traditional safeguards of justice, e.g., cross-examination and 
summation; (3) utilizing expert testimony; and (4) implementing 
cautionary jury instructions. Part II will conclude that, balancing the 
beneficial effects of the solution per ordinariness with the willingness of 
the judiciary to enact a proposed remedy, cautionary jury instructions are 
the most feasible solution. Part III will analyze current cross-racial 
identification jury instructions and argue that future cautionary 
instructions should: (1) be mandatory in all cases where a cross-racial 
identification occurs; (2) use objective language; and (3) be administered 
separate from the general eyewitness testimony instruction and prior to the 
testimony which includes the cross-racial identification. 
I. THE FALLIBILITY OF CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATIONS 
“[M]istaken identifications have been responsible for more 
miscarriages of justice than any other factor—more so perhaps than all 
other factors combined.”
20
 For over 80 years, social scientists have 
analyzed the fallibility of eyewitness testimony.
21
 Thanks to these 
researchers and the work of the Innocence Project, an organization that 
uses DNA evidence to exonerate wrongfully convicted persons, the faulty 
nature of eyewitness testimony has been consistently verified.
22
 One study 
found that mistaken identifications factor in more than 75% of all 
overturned convictions, which is especially disconcerting considering the 
consequences of wrongful convictions: the incarceration and or death of 
 
 
 20. John C. Brigham et al., Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and 
Scientific Issues, 36 COURT REVIEW 12 (1999) (quoting PATRICK WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
IN CRIMINAL CASES (1964)). 
 21. For one of the earliest known studies of eyewitness testimony frailty, see EDWIN M. 
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). In his research, Borchard noted 65 instances of 
wrongful conviction, finding that mistaken eyewitness identification was one of the most prominent 
causes. Id. at xiii; see also Christian A. Meissner & John Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the 
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (2001).  
 22. The Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org (last accessed Jan. 
10, 2015); Stephen J. Saltzburg, Report to House of Delegates, 104D A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. J. 1, 6 (2008) 
(“Approximately three-quarters of more than 200 wrongful convictions in the United States overturned 
through DNA testing resulted from eyewitness misidentifications.”); see also Samuel R. Gross, 
Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 174–76 (2008). 
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innocent individuals.
23
 While courts have spent significant breath and ink 
discussing the many issues eyewitness testimony poses though, little has 
been done to actually prevent or correct wrongful convictions.
24
 
A. Eyewitness Testimony 
Justice Frankfurter famously stated in 1927 that “the identification of 
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy . . . the hazards of such testimony 
are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of 
 
 
 23. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1490-91 (2008); Sandra Guerra 
Thompson, Wrongful Conviction Issues: Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. 
L. REV. 639, 639 (2009) [hereinafter Thompson, Wrongful Conviction] (“As of this writing, 252 people 
have been exonerated by means of DNA evidence, most leaving prison cells after many years in 
prison. These exonerations represent only the ‘tip of the iceberg’—the actual number of wrongly 
convicted people are undoubtedly much higher.”); see also Understand the Causes: Eyewitness 
Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 24. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“[T]he vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification.”); White v. State, 926 P.2d 291, 294 (Nev. 1996) (“Courts have long 
recognized that eyewitness testimony is highly unreliable.”); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 463–64 
(N.J. 1999) (citing Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978)) (“[C]enturies of experience in 
the administration of criminal justice have shown that convictions based solely on testimony that 
identifies a defendant previously unknown to the witness is highly suspect. Of all the various kinds of 
evidence it is the least reliable, especially where unsupported by corroborating evidence.”). See also 
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 154 (Mass. 2004) (citing Meissner & Brigham, supra 
note 21); Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 775–76 (Pa. 2014) (citing research conducted by 
the Amici Innocence Network and the Pennsylvania Innocence Project asserting the prominence of 
mistaken eyewitness identifications); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) (“There is no 
significant division of opinion on the issue. The studies lead inexorably to the conclusion that human 
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible.”); Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 461 
(N.J. 1999) (“[F]or more than forty years, empirical studies concerning the psychological factors 
affecting eyewitness cross-racial or cross-ethnic identifications have appeared with increasing 
frequency in professional literature of the behavioral and social sciences.”).  
 See Thompson, Wrongful Conviction, supra note 23, at 640 (“Studies led to numerous proposals 
for the reform of police procedures, yet we see little progress toward minimizing eyewitness 
identification error, a major cause of failure in our criminal justice systems.”). This lack of willingness 
to confront the problems inherent in eyewitness testimony is apparent in both trial and appellate courts. 
See id. at 642 (“The courts often overlook other indicia of reliability . . . [D]ubious eyewitness 
identification evidence continues to be admitted, and appellate courts continue to turn a blind eye to 
defense challenges based on suggestiveness and unreliability of evidence.”). And while even 
incremental change would be expected over time, studies of appellate holdings regarding eyewitness 
identification challenges are unreasonably bleak. See id. at n.22 (“A study of cases involving 
exonerations showed that constitutional challenges to eyewitness identifications had been rejected in 
100% of the cases. . . . Apparently, even a heightened awareness of wrongful convictions and the 
perils of eyewitness identifications have not caused most appellate courts to review identification 
claims more generously.”). This leads to the ultimate conclusion that “reform in the criminal justice 
system will always be resisted.” Robert Buckhout, Nobody Likes a Smartass: Expert Testimony by 
Psychologists, 3 SOC. ACTION & L. 39, 49 (June 1976). 
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English and American trials.”
25
 In stark contrast to Justice Frankfurter’s 
concession, eyewitness testimony continues to be one of the most 
persuasive forms of evidence to jurors. In a sociological study regarding 
the power of eyewitness testimony, jurors in a simulated criminal trial 
were presented with facts and conditions and then were asked to vote on 
whether to convict the defendant.
26
 As expected, the study found that only 
18% of jurors were in favor of conviction when there were no 
eyewitnesses to the crime, while 72% voted to convict when at least one 
credible witness saw the crime occur.
27
 Disturbingly, though, 68% of 
jurors still voted to convict the defendant when the eyewitness was clearly 
and thoroughly discredited by counsel.
28
 In criminal trials, this misplaced 
faith in eyewitnesses is the result of two unique, compounding problems: 
(1) human memory is inaccurate and changes over time, thus actual 
witness testimony is often inaccurate; and (2) juries tend to believe and 
rely heavily on eyewitness testimony when the witness appears confident 
in her recollection.
29
 Compound this with the “one-witness rule”—which 
allows a conviction based upon a single witness’s identification of the 
defendant, despite the lack of any corroborating evidence—and the results 
are terrifying.
30
  
Human memory is complex, and the procedural aspects of memory are 
often misunderstood. Laymen incorrectly believe that the mind operates 
like a video camera, recording events as they occur and storing them for 
 
 
 25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 
30 (1927)); see also United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J., 
concurring) (“[Eyewitness identification] is at best, highly dubious, given the extensive empirical 
evidence that eyewitness identifications are not reliable.”). 
 26. Long, 721 P.2d at 488 (citing Buckhout, supra note 24, at 189–90). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; see also Aaron H. Chiu, “We Can’t Tell Them Apart”: When and How the Court Should 
Educate Jurors on the Potential Inaccuracies of Cross-Racial Identifications, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 415, 419 (2007) (“[J]urors generally tend to believe eyewitness accounts 
and take them at face value, even in ‘extremely doubtful’ circumstances.”). 
 29. See generally Harvey Gee, Book Review: Eyewitness Testimony and Cross Racial 
Identification, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 835 (2001) [hereinafter Gee, Eyewitness Testimony]; Cromedy, 
727 A.2d 457, 461 (N.J. 1999) (“[J]urors tend to place great weight on eyewitness identifications, 
often ignoring other exculpatory evidence.”). 
 30. See Thompson, Wrongful Conviction, supra note 23; see also Rutledge, supra note 2, at 207 
(“Many cases are based entirely upon uncorroborated eyewitness IDs.”). In a Maryland case, a 
Hispanic eyewitness made a pretrial statement identifying the defendant, who was African American, 
as the perpetrator. At trial, the eyewitness pointed to a different individual, the African American law 
student who was representing the defendant, and identified him as the perpetrator of the crime, despite 
the defendant being in the courtroom. The charges against the defendant were ultimately dismissed. 
See David E. Aaronson, Proposed Maryland Jury Instruction on Cross-Racial Identification, 3 CRIM. 
L. BRIEF 2 (Spring 2008). 
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perfect playback at a later date. Human memory, though, does not operate 
in this manner; the “human brain cannot receive and store all the stimuli 
simultaneously presented to it, . . . forc[ing] individuals to be selective in 
what they perceive of any given event.”
31
 Events are recorded and stored 
in three unique stages, each with the potential for flaws and errors.
32
 This 
makes memories “more like physical trace evidence, which can be altered, 
mishandled, contaminated, or degraded.”
33
 
Despite the flaws in memory, eyewitnesses are often confident in their 
recollection of an event. Educated members of the legal community—
especially prosecutors—believe that confident witnesses are more likely to 
be accurate in their recollections and jurors, unsurprisingly, are equally 
persuaded, regardless of the actual accuracy of the identification.
34
 As 
noted by the Sixth Circuit, “of all the evidence that may be presented to a 
jury, a witness’ [sic] in-court statement that ‘he is the one’ is probably the 
most dramatic and persuasive.”
35
 Unfortunately, “the correlation between 
confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identifications is far lower than 
people probably would expect.”
36
 Even under the “best of circumstances, 
eyewitness confidence is only a modest predictor of eyewitness accuracy,” 
due to confounding factors, such as own-race bias in cross-racial 
identifications.
37
 
 
 
 31. See Long, 721 P.2d at 488, 489 (citing Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 
171, 172–81 (1975)); see also John C. Brigham et al., supra note 20, at 12. 
 32. See id. at 488–90. The “memory process” consists of three stages: 1. the acquisition of 
information; 2. the storage of information; and 3. the retrieval and communication of information. Id.; 
see also Joseph F. Savage Jr. & James P. Devendorf, Conviction After Misidentification: Are Jury 
Instructions A Solution?, 35 CHAMPION 30, 30 (2011) (“[T]he processes underlying eyewitness 
memory are dynamic and prone to error. Memory is an unconscious process that includes three 
stages—acquisition or encoding, retention, and recall or retrieval. Numerous physical and 
psychological factors can influence memory accuracy at each stage.”).  
 33. Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 30. 
 34. Steven Pernod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their 
Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 817 (1995). In one study, 75% of prosecutors 
surveyed incorrectly believed that the eyewitness identification of a confident witness was more likely 
to be accurate. Id. In the same study, 56% of jury-eligible citizens reported the incorrect belief that the 
eyewitness identification of a confident witness was more likely to be accurate. Id. at 818. See also 
Rutledge, supra note 2, at 223. 
 35. United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066–67 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 36. United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 37. Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plethora of 
psychological factors affect the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identifications, including the 
“forgetting curve,” which explains how memory decreases over time, and the “feedback factor,” which 
theorizes that individual witnesses unconsciously reinforce mistaken identifications in discussing the 
case. See Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 29, at 838. For information on additional 
psychological variables and their effect on eyewitness identifications, see Thompson, Wrongful 
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B. Cross-Racial Identification 
A cross-racial identification occurs when an individual of one race 
attempts to identify an individual of another race.
38
 Eyewitnesses are more 
accurate in identifying members of their own race than they are in 
identifying member of other races.
39
 This phenomenon is known as “own-
race bias.”
40
 Courts first began examining the problems of own-race bias 
in 1972.
41
 While at that time the science behind cross-racial identifications 
was still relatively undeveloped, own-race bias is now scientifically 
accepted.
42
  
Courts are, in fact, “painfully aware of miscarriages of justice caused 
by wrongful identification. Those experienced in criminal trial work or 
familiar with the administration of justice understand that one of the great 
problems of proof is posed by eyewitness identification, especially in 
 
 
Conviction, supra note 23, at 640, 643 and Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32 (citing Saul M. Kassin 
et al., On the ‘General Acceptance’ of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001)). 
 38. See generally Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 294 (Md. 2005); Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 
340 (Del. 2003); Rutledge, supra note 2, at 211. 
 39. See generally Molly Donnelly, Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005), 12 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359, 361 (2006); Aaronson, supra note 30; Rutledge, supra note 2; John C. 
Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOLOGY 673 (1982). Multiple courts have chosen to recognize this research as valid when 
discussing cross-racial identifications. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461 (N.J. 1999) (“[E]yewitnesses experience a cross-racial impairment when 
identifying members of another race.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. See generally Nelson v. State, 914 S.W.2d 670 (Tx. Crim. App. 1996) (“[S]cientific studies 
support a finding that cross-racial identifications are less accurate than the same-race identifications. 
This is generally referred to as the own-race effect.”) (Grant, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Gary L. 
Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do 
About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 230 (Mar. 2001); Smith, 880 A.2d at 294. 
 41. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The available data, while 
not exhaustive, unanimously supports the widely held commonsense view that members of one race 
have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race.”) (Bazelon, J., 
concurring).  
 42. See Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 154 (Mass. 2004) (“While the data 
supporting what social scientists call ‘own-race bias’ may have been ‘meager’ when the Telfaire court 
first weighed in on the theory in the early 1970’s, more than thirty years of research have provided an 
abundance of reliable data for judicial consideration.”) (Cordy, J. concurring); see also State v. 
Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461 (N.J. 1999) (“For more than forty years, empirical studies concerning the 
psychological factors affecting eyewitness cross-racial or cross-ethnic identifications have appeared 
with increasing frequency in professional literature of the behavioral and social sciences.”). See Smith, 
880 A.2d at 296 (citing Wells & Olson, supra note 40, at 230) (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that 
there is internal validity to the studies showing the other-race effect.”); Nelson, 914 S.W.2d at 672 
(“[S]cholarly literature attacking the trustworthiness of cross-racial identification is legion. Most 
scientific studies support a finding that cross-racial identifications are less accurate than the same-race 
identifications.”); Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 467 (“[T]here is an impressive consistency in results showing 
that problems exist with cross-racial eyewitness identification.”). 
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cross-racial identification.”
43
 Yet few attempts have been made to resolve 
the racial disparities that own-race bias creates within the legal system.
44
 
Courts have expressed two primary concerns regarding the validity of 
own-race bias theory: (1) apprehension regarding the legitimacy of cross-
racial identification research due to the existence of extant questions as to 
why own-race bias occurs;
45
 and (2) anxiety over the prominence of own-
race bias in real-world situations, since the vast majority of the research on 
the subject has been conducted in controlled, laboratory experiments.
46
  
Courts have questioned the legitimacy or own-race bias research due to 
open questions in the field as to why the phenomenon occurs.
47
 One 
theory—the personal bias theory—suggests that own-race bias is caused 
 
 
 43. Rutledge, supra note 2, at 212 (citing Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 44. See id. at 210 (“Cross-racial eyewitness IDs have yet to receive more than a cursory 
discussion in our legal journals and classrooms.”). 
 45. See generally People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. 2004) (“While scientists 
generally agree that some witnesses experience “own-race” bias, they disagree about the extent to 
which it affects identification and to which racial groups it applies.”); Nelson, 914 S.W.2d at 672 (“[I]t 
is true that the precise explanation for the own-race effect is still evolving, but according to the Cornell 
Law Review, the existence of the phenomenon is universally accepted.”); Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 463–
64 (“Although researchers generally agree that some eyewitnesses exhibit an own-race bias, they 
disagree about the degree to which own-race bias affects identification.”); Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, 
supra note 29, at 844 (“It is still unclear whether this cross-racial identification problem is due to the 
fact that people have greater prejudices or less experiences with members of the other races. 
Psychologists do not really have the answer.”). 
 46.  See Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect, Beyond Recognition of Faces in the 
Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 170, 170–73 (Mar. 2001). The majority of laboratory 
experiments have been evaluated using a “facial recognition paradigm.” Id. This style of experiment 
consists of showing subjects a number of photographs of faces, then after a period of time, showing the 
subjects a new set of faces that also includes a several of the pictures from the previous set. See Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 938 
(June 1984). The subject is then asked to select the first set of faces from the second grouping. Id. 
Scores are recorded as “hits” or “false alarms.” Id. These scores are then divided into relevant 
categories (such as race) and measured for statistical significance. Id. 
 As of 2005, only three field studies investigating own-race bias had been published. Smith, 880 
A.2d at 296. These studies, performed on subjects in various locations, reproduced the results of the 
laboratory experiments addressed above. See generally Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 681 (study in 
which black and white store clerks were asked to identify photographs of black and white subjects who 
posed as customers); Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness 
Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 972, 977–78 (1988) (modeled after the 
Brigham study, though with the inclusion of Hispanic participants as both customers and clerks); 
Daniel Wright et al., Eyewitness Identification, A Field Study of Own-Race Bias in South Africa and 
England, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 119 (2001) (black and white subjects asked to view black and 
white individuals in lineup then required to identify photos of same individuals from collection of 
photographs).  
 47. See Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3 (discussing proposed theories regarding the cause of own-
race bias).  
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by the witness’s intentional bigotry and intolerance.
48
 Studies have 
consistently indicated, however, that “whites who are free from conscious 
racial animus do not perform better at facial recognition than those who 
hold prejudiced attitudes.”
49
 In rejecting the personal bas theory, the term 
“own-race bias does not refer to racial prejudice” in modern research.
50
 
A competing theory—ethnocentric homogeneity—suggests that 
individuals develop physical triggers when analyzing members of their 
own race that do not apply to members of other races.
51
 Based on the idea 
that individuals of the same race have similar characteristics, researchers 
believe individuals learn to focus on unique racialized traits that help 
differentiate the members of their race.
52
 These triggers do not translate 
well to other races, causing those same individuals to struggle when 
confronted with the challenge of identifying a member of a different racial 
group. Supporters of ethnocentric homogeneity point to the United States, 
where Caucasians are the predominant racial group in many parts of the 
country, as proof of the theory. Studies performed in the United States 
have indicated that “whites have trouble recognizing unfamiliar African-
American faces . . . because they fail to focus on salient facial cues for 
recognition” of black individuals.
53
 Unlike the personal bias theory, 
 
 
 48. See generally Smith, 880 A.2d at 297 (citing Meissner & Brigham, supra note 21, at 7) 
(“[e]arly research indicated that racial attitudes appeared to influence the degree of stereotyping 
assigned to other-race members, [but this theory] has not garnered wide support in the scientific 
community because researchers have failed to find a correlation between racial attitudes and the own-
race effect.”); Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 29, at 844 (“[C]ontrary to widely held 
assumptions, racial attitudes and the amount of interracial experience were found not to be related 
systematically to recognition accuracy for subjects of their race.”). 
 49. Rand, supra note 3, at 35. 
 50. Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 154 (Mass. 2004) (Cordy, J., concurring) 
(citing Sporer, supra note 46, at 170); see also Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 24 (“[W]hite witnesses 
who are not racially prejudiced are just as likely to be mistaken in making cross-racial identification as 
those who are prejudiced.”). 
 51. See Gee, Justice, supra note 12, at 102 (quoting Interview with Elizabeth Loftus, Forensic 
Psychologist, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/loftus.html. 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2015)) (“If you’re looking at the face of an Asian person and you’re Caucasian 
maybe you notice those eyes because they are a little bit unusual. Later you go to a lineup and those 
unusual eyes are present in all the cases because you’ve got a lineup that’s full of Asians and that 
doesn’t help you very much in making that discrimination–which particular face did I see.”); see also 
Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3 (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL 103, 105 (4th ed. 2007)) (“[P]eople make more mistakes on a cross-racial identification 
for a number of reasons, including, but not limited to . . . time spent encoding features that are less 
useful in discriminating people from other groups.”). 
 52. Smith, 880 A.2d at 297 (citing Johnson, supra note 46, at 945). 
 53. Rand, supra note 3, at 36; Gee, supra note 29, at 838 (“[W]ith regard to white recognition of 
African-American faces, the researchers noted that whites tended to ‘deploy their attention more 
widely over black faces,’ and did not focus on features that would be probative of identification of a 
particular African-American face.”); see also Rand, supra note 3, at 36. 
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physiognomic homogeneity still has traction within the field of own-race 
bias theory. 
The most widely accepted theory, though, suggests that own-race bias 
is due to a lack of quality interaction with individuals of other races.
54
 
This explanation is known as the “interracial contact theory,”
55
 and builds 
off of physiognomic homogeneity. Research has shown that “persons who 
primarily interact within their own racial group, especially if they are in 
the majority, will better perceive and process the subtlety of facial features 
of persons within their own racial group than persons of other racial 
groups.”
56
 Thus, “the subject will only improve at facial recognition if she 
has significant, long-term, quality contacts with [other races].”
57
 The 
ability to accurately identify members of another race under the interracial 
contact theory is dependent on the quality, not quantity, of time spent with 
and around members of that race.
58
 The interracial contact theory is 
gaining wide acceptance in the social science community, with several 
studies validating its hypothesis.
59
 The theory is gaining traction judicially 
as well, as several courts have cited the theory in regards to cross-racial 
identifications.
60
 Until researchers reach a stronger consensus regarding 
the source of own-race bias though, courts are likely to maintain their 
apprehension. 
The judiciary is also concerned that controlled, clinical studies of own-
race bias may not translate to the actual courtroom. One of the most 
 
 
 54. See generally Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3; Rand, supra note 3, at 35 (“[S]tudies have 
shown that the own-race phenomenon is particularly caused by a lack of familiarity with people from 
other ethnic groups, not from racial animus.”). 
 55. Smith, 880 A.2d at 297 (citing Meissner & Brigham, supra note 21, at 7). 
 56. Aaronson, supra note 30, at 2 (citing Johnson, supra note 46). 
 57. Rand, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Paul J. Lavrakas et al., A Perspective on the Recognition of 
Other-Race Faces, 20 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 475, 480 (1976)); see also James M. Doyle, 
Discounting the Error Costs: Cross-Racial False Alarms in the Culture of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice, 7 PSYCH., PUB POL’Y & L. 253, 256 (Mar. 2001) (“[T]he ability to identify faces of another 
race is a function not simply of the absolute amount of exposure one has had to members of that race 
but also of the quality of that exposure.”) (citation omitted). 
 58. Rand, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Lavrakas et al., supra note 57) (“[E]ven basic experience 
with people from other races would not be enough to improve recognition.”) Due to this finding, 
“being white and having African-American friends would improve recognition more than simply 
having grown up in an ‘integrated neighborhood or having gone to school with blacks.’” Id. 
 59. See Doyle, supra note 57, at 256 (citing Roy S. Malpass et al., Basketball Fandom and 
Cross-Racial Identification among European-Americans: Another Look At The Contact Hypothesis, 
presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach, CA 
(Mar. 1988). The Malpass study indicated that non-black hardcore basketball fans performed better 
when identifying black subjects than did the general populace. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 8 A.3d 844, 847 (N.J. App. Div. 2010) (The trial court judge noted 
that white witness was “an individual who had substantial contacts with the urban community.”). 
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widely cited laboratory studies compared two racially unique student 
bodies: Howard University, a predominantly black university, and the 
University of Illinois, a predominantly white university.
61
 Photographs of 
both black and white males were shown to the test subjects. After several 
hours, each subject was given a new set of photographs and asked to pick 
out the faces he or she recognized from the original set of pictures.
62
 At 
both universities, the subjects accurately identified faces matching their 
own race at an incredibly high rate and struggled to identify faces of the 
other race.
63
 
Although studies of cross-racial identification, such as the one 
performed at Howard University, have largely been confined to 
laboratories, there is “no particular reason to think that the other-race 
effect . . . does not apply [to] eyewitnesses in actual criminal cases.”
64
 And 
in a disturbing real-life case study, the Innocence Project determined that 
150 of the 200 wrongful convictions which the organization had 
overturned through DNA testing resulted from eyewitness 
misidentifications.
65
 Of these egregious mistakes, roughly 50% were 
cross-racial misidentifications.
66
 There is no denying that criminal 
convictions “hinged upon a cross-racial identification . . . pose a 
significant problem in the American justice system.”
67
 
 
 
 61. See Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. While both groups were inaccurate identifying members of another race, the students 
from University of Illinois made nearly three times more false identifications when identifying the 
photographs of black males than their counterparts at Howard University did when identifying the 
photographs of white students. Id. See also Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3 (citing Terrence S. Luce, The 
Role of Experience in Inter-Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 40 
(1974)). Aaronson discusses a study showing that Japanese and Chinese Americans performed much 
better at identifying Asian American faces than African American Faces. The study additionally 
showed that Japanese Americans performed slightly better at identifying Japanese American faces than 
Chinese American faces, and vice versa for the Chinese Americans. Id.  
 64. Smith, 880 A.2d at 297 (quoting Deborah Bartolomey, Cross-Racial Identification Testimony 
and What Not To Do About It, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 247, 249 (Mar. 2001)). 
 65. See Aaronson, supra note 30, at 3 (citing Eyewitness Misidentification and Facts on Post-
Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last accessed 
Jan. 10, 2015)). 
 66. Id. Some of the cases of cross-racial identification are extremely disturbing. See Chiu, supra 
note 28, at 417 (discussing WALL, supra note 20, at 26). One particular case stands out. Five victims 
were kidnapped, raped, and robbed. The victims had spent several hours with their attacker. For trial, 
they were asked to identify the perpetrator. Id. Each victim independently identified the same man as 
the attacker. Id. It was later discovered and verified that the man identified had been several hundred 
miles away at the time of the attack, and could not have been the perpetrator. Id. The attacker, when 
finally apprehended, shared little in common with the suspect identified by the victims outside of his 
skin color. Id. 
 67. Chiu, supra note 28, at 416; see generally Aaronson, supra note 30, at 2 (“An inaccurate 
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C. Judicial Responsiveness 
While courts historically recognized the affects race had on the legal 
system, judges were hesitant to directly address these shortcomings in the 
courtroom and rarely took special measures to prevent racial disparities.
68
 
Juries, as a result of the reluctance to address race in the courtroom, were 
themselves hesitant to discuss racial concerns they felt were important to 
particular legal matters.
69
 In the past fifteen years, however, courts have 
slowly begun to confront the existence of own-race bias.
70
 While 
recognition and discussion of the problem is an important first step, judges 
have yet to implement protective measures in the courtroom to alleviate 
own-race bias. Courts have instead relied, incorrectly, on the belief that 
jurors understand the inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications, and thus 
can “sniff out” false identifications themselves during trial.
71
 Relying on 
this belief, courts have rejected measures to resolve own-race bias that 
extend beyond traditional safeguards of justice.
72
 In allowing counsel to 
 
 
identification due to the so-called ‘own race’ effect may result in higher wrongful conviction rates 
when defendants are of different races than the witnesses who identify them.”); Gee, Eyewitness 
Testimony, supra note 29, at 840 (2001) (“The own-race effect is strongest and most consistent where 
white subjects attempt to identify white faces, and the risk of misidentification is greatest where the 
victim is white and the defendant is African American.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 340 (Del. 2003) (addressing State v. Cromedy, 727 
A.2d 457, 463–64 (N.J. 1999)) (“The New Jersey court reviewed an impressive mass of social science 
and legal authority on the issue [of own-race bias] and concluded that an instruction was necessary to 
alert the jury that it should pay close attention to the possible influence of race.”); Rutledge, supra note 
2, at 210 n.29 (quoting Cunningham v. Peters, 941 F.2d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J. 
dissenting)) (“All eyewitness testimony is problematic, given the frailties of human memory. 
Identification by members of other races is especially so.”). See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[W]e have developed a reluctance–almost a taboo–to even admit the 
existence of the problem, let alone provide the jury with the information necessary to evaluate its 
impact. This reluctance apparently grows out of a well-intentioned effort to insulate criminal trials 
from base appeals to racial prejudice.”). See generally United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 
1978) (holding expert testimony on cross-racial identification inadmissible because it would not be of 
probative value to jurors); United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
cross-racial identification is an “issue of which the jury generally is aware.”); People v. Dixon, 410 
N.E.2d 252 (Ill. App. 1980) (holding expert testimony on cross-racial identification inadmissible 
because own-race bias is within the common knowledge of the average juror). 
 69. See Nelson v. State, 914 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tx. Crim. App. 1996) (concurring opinion) 
(“Many jurors and lay persons, however, may be inhibited by the fear that acknowledging [own-race 
bias] might be considered stereotyping or bigotry.”).  
 70. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 461 (“The reliability of [cross-racial] identification, though 
discussed in many cases throughout the country, is an issue of first impression in New Jersey.”). 
 71. “[S]ome courtroom observers have commented that the ordinary person’s difficulty of cross-
racial recognition is so commonplace as to be the subject of both cliché and joke: ‘they all look alike.’” 
Id. at 467; See Nelson, 914 S.W.2d 670. 
 72. Common safeguards of justice, as far as addressed here, indicate cross-examination and 
closing argument. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 463–64 (noting the reluctance of other courts to install 
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discuss own-race bias in closing arguments, one court reasoned, “jurors 
may be reminded of what everyone else knows, and they may . . . take 
notice of those facts which are of such general notoriety as to be matters of 
common knowledge. Thus, during closing argument, counsel may state 
and discuss the evidence and argue matters of common knowledge.”
73
  
Courts confound express racism (e.g., burning a cross in Georgia or the 
use of racial slurs) with nuanced implicit racial discrimination in holding 
that own-race bias is within “the ambit of jurors’ general knowledge.”74 
While overt racial tension is easy to recognize and consistently observed 
by most Americans, the average citizen does not know of or understand 
own-race bias.
75
 The judiciary’s myopic determination that own-race bias 
is within “the ambit of jurors’ general knowledge” therefore exacerbates 
the problem of ordinariness—which states that race discrimination “is 
difficult to address or cure because it is not acknowledged.”
76
 Courts that 
have attempted to remedy own-race bias have stated as much, correctly 
noting that the general populace does not recognize or understand the 
subconscious biases of cross-racial identifications.
77
 
 
 
additional protections against own-race bias as “cross-examination and summation are adequate 
safeguards to highlight unreliable identifications.”). Courts have rejected further remedies, such as 
expert testimony, holding that own-race bias can and should be resolved internally by the jury. See 
Nelson, 914 S.W.2d at 672 (“In the case of People v. Dixon, 87 Ill. App. 3d 814 (Ill. App. 1980), the 
court ruled that expert testimony was not admissible on cross-racial identification because the matter 
was of common knowledge.”). As support for this holding, the court stated, “We have all heard, I am 
sure, of the notion that to whites all blacks look alike and all Asians look alike and similar folk notions 
. . . [based on studies] there seems to be some validity to this notion.” Id. (internal citation omitted) 
Thus, the proposed expert testimony “resulted in a verification of an already common belief.” Id.  
 Interestingly, the court contradicted itself by claiming that beliefs regarding racial homogeny were 
“folk notions.” As noted by the folklorist Alan Dundes, “folk ideas” are defined as “traditional notions 
that a group of people have about the nature of humanity, the world, and life in general,” or “unstated 
premises which underlie the thought and action of a given group of people.” Jay H. Bernstein, Folk 
Concepts, in 21ST CENTURY ANTHROPOLOGY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 848 (2010). They are 
necessarily “part of the unconscious or un-self conscious culture of a people.” Id. However, for a 
matter to be common knowledge, as the court believed cross-racial identifications were, “the thought 
itself should be conscious.” Id. 
 73. Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 299 (Md. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 74. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 628. 
 75. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 
29. 
 76. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 628; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 8. 
 77. See generally State v. Walker, 8 A.3d 844, 848 (N.J. App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he Court’s 
holding in Cromedy was based upon the fact that eyewitnesses experience a cross-racial impairment 
when identifying members of another race, with decreased accuracy in the recognition of other-race 
faces [that] is not within the observer’s conscious control.”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. 
Zimmerman, 804 N.E.2d 336, 344 (Mass. 2004) (concurring opinion) (“Modern studies also 
persuasively undermine the contention . . . that the reliability of cross-racial identifications is not 
beyond the ordinary experience and common knowledge of the average juror.”) (citations omitted); 
United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (M. D. Ala. 2009) (“The potential inaccuracies of 
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Courts must recognize that “the average person thinks that eyewitness 
testimony generally is more accurate than it actually is.”
78
 Laypersons are 
not aware of the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony and appear to be 
“insensitive to . . . the impact of cross-racial identifications on eyewitness 
accuracy.”
79
 Understanding this lack of awareness, courts should then 
specifically address own-race bias and find a solution tailored to correct 
disparities created by cross-racial identifications.  
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: THE INTERSECTION OF CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY AND THE JUDICIARY 
Critical race theorists assert, through ordinariness, that because race is 
not specifically acknowledged, the problem of race discrimination is 
difficult to cure.
80
 Applying this theory to own-race bias, the best way to 
prevent further conviction and incarceration of innocent individuals due to 
cross-racial misidentifications is with a race-specific approach.
81
 There are 
four commonly proposed solutions: (1) excluding eyewitness testimony 
entirely; (2) relying on traditional safeguards of justice such as cross-
examination and summation; (3) utilizing expert testimony; and 
(4) implementing cautionary jury instructions.  
While critical race theorists would promote the solution which best 
alerts the jury to the racial complications of own-race bias, the judiciary is 
slow to adopt change and unlikely to apply radical measures.
82
 Courts will 
weigh several concerns in determining whether to implement a proposed 
solution, including procedural interests (e.g., the use of limited resources 
including time and money) and substantive worries (e.g., the risk that race 
would inappropriately affect the outcomes of trials).
83
 A realistic solution 
 
 
cross-racial identifications are not necessarily within the common knowledge of the average juror or, 
for that matter, the average judge.”). 
 78. Zimmerman, 804 N.E.2d at 344. 
 79. Id. (citation omitted). 
 80. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 7. 
 81. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 2 (“There is a need to take prophylactic action on the front-
end rather than take action many years down the road when mistakenly identified persons have served 
time in prison.”); see also Rutledge, supra note 2, at 214 (“Innocent people have been, and continue to 
be, stripped of their liberty simply because ‘they all look alike.’”) (citation omitted). 
 82. See Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (“[D]espite judicial recognition of the documented unreliability of 
eyewitness identification, courts have been slow both to accord the problem the attention it deserves 
and to fashion ways of minimizing its potentially unjust effects. The fault probably lies with the 
narrowness of the vision of most lawyers and judges. We tend to comfortably rely upon settled legal 
precedent and practice . . . and to largely ignore the teachings of other disciplines.”). 
 83. In 2010, a research team at Iowa State University calculated that a murder trial–the most 
expensive criminal trial–cost the society on average $17.25 million. This included costs of the victim 
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must reconcile educating the jury on the scientifically proven fallibility of 
cross-racial identifications with the legitimate procedural and substantive 
concerns of the court. 
A. Excluding Eyewitness Testimony 
Radical opponents of eyewitness testimony have called for the 
exclusion of such evidence where the identification is uncorroborated.
84
 
However, “[t]o date, no court has excluded an eyewitness’ identification 
from trial based solely on its unreliability due to the human memory 
process. Because eyewitness identifications are often correct, in fairness to 
the interests of the crime victims, it would be unadvisable and unrealistic 
to expect courts to exclude them.”
85
 In response, some scholars have 
 
 
and the criminal, as well as services by the state. ISU Team Calculates Societal Costs of Five Major 
Crimes; Finds Murder at $17.25 million, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.news.iastate.edu/news/2010/sep/costofcrime#sthash.24D5akIo.dpuf. A burglary trial—the 
least costly of the five crimes researched in the study—still cost an average of $41,288. Id. As courts 
around the country encounter fiscal trouble, cuts must be made, and the costs of trial are scrutinized 
more intensely. See Budget Cuts Start to Hurt Courts, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES BY AMERICAN LAWYER 
MEDIA (Mar. 29, 2013), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/03/budget-cuts-start-to-hurt-courts.html 
(mandatory furloughs are now being imposed in states across the country, including Colorado, Utah, 
California, New York, Missouri, and Washington. Eric Holder, then-U.S. Attorney General, has 
ordered federal departments to “to heighten our scrutiny of all spending and redouble our efforts to 
reduce expenses.”); see also Is Eyewitness Testimony Too Unreliable to Trust, THE WEEK (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://theweek.com/article/index/221008/is-eyewitness-testimony-too-unreliable-to-trust (“Some 
argue that evaluating eyewitness testimony with more complex procedures will further slow trials in 
already overextended courts.”). 
 As a simple hypothetical to illustrate the courts’ substantive concern, consider a black victim who, 
while having spent little time around Caucasians, accurately identifies the perpetrator of a crime 
against her as a white male. There is never any question within the trial of explicit racism, and, due to 
the accuracy of her identification, implicit problems associated with race such as those discussed in 
this analysis did not affect the victim’s ability to accurately identify the accused. In this case, 
discussion of race and the failures of cross-racial identification may cloud the jury’s ability to assess 
the facts of the case, resulting in increased focus on the racial composition of the parties, which here is 
irrelevant. In the worst-case scenario, this science alone could motivate the jury to incorrectly dismiss 
the victim’s testimony altogether, resulting in the guilty accused going free. See Chiu, supra note 28, 
at 419 (“Given the lack of conclusive factual data, many judges are reluctant to allow the issue of 
cross-racial identification to be introduced at trial. In addition, courts also hesitate to allow discussion 
of the issue due to its possibly racially inflammatory nature.”); Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 19 
(“Concerned about the conviction of innocent persons on the basis of erroneous eyewitness 
identifications, the courts have struggled in recent years to balance the rights of defendants threatened 
by the specter of incorrect eyewitness identification with the need to prosecute cases based upon 
disputed eyewitness identification evidence.”). An additional concern is that telling jurors to question 
the racial implications of a victim’s identification will only further validate the current culture of 
“victim-blaming” many believe is prevalent in the United States. Is Eyewitness Testimony Too 
Unreliable to Trust, supra. 
 84. See Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 29. 
 85. Id. at 845–46 (citing Cathy M. Holt, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications: 
Invading the Province of the Jury?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 399 (1984)). 
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called for a less radical plan in which eyewitness testimony would be 
excluded only where the identification is “likely to cause unfair prejudice, 
confuse the issue, or mislead the jury.”
86
 However, this solution leaves the 
arbitrary decision to exclude evidence in the hands of the court, and 
ultimately does not provide any more safety than the protections currently 
afforded under the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state procedural 
guidelines.
87
  
Critical race theory opposes the exclusion of eyewitness testimony. 
While excluding eyewitness testimony prevents wrongful convictions 
caused by faulty cross-racial identifications in specific situations, it does 
little to address the underlying problem of unintentional racial 
discrimination. Excluding eyewitness testimony does not educate courts or 
juries on own-race bias, or the racial disparities it creates in the legal 
system. Additionally, where other evidence corroborates a cross-racial 
identification, testimony would be allowed without judicial comment 
regarding own-race bias. This holds true even if the corroborated 
identification is inaccurate.  
The judiciary would reject, and has rejected, the exclusion of 
eyewitness testimony. While excluding eyewitness testimony does not 
aggravate the procedural concerns of the judiciary, the substantive 
concerns of the court are violated. The exclusion of eyewitness testimony 
makes it difficult to prosecute guilty individuals, especially when the 
witness’s identification is uncorroborated. Eyewitness testimony, while 
flawed, is often necessary to a criminal case, and the exclusion of such 
evidence would result in significant injustice to the victim.
88
 Courts would 
not adopt such a radical change.  
 
 
 86. Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 29, at 845–46.  
 87. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the 
jury.”). 
 88. See Aaronson, supra note 30, at 4 (“Eyewitness identifications are often reliable and 
persuasive evidence, [but] thirty years of social science research and the contributions of the Innocence 
Project . . . have shown that erroneous eyewitness identifications are the single greatest cause of 
wrongful convictions nationwide.”). See Gee, supra note 29; see also United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 
12, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is only in extraordinary cases that identification evidence should be 
withheld from the jury.”); contra State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986) (citing U.K. Special 
Committee, which determined “trial judges should be required to instruct juries that an uncorroborated 
visual identification alone could not be a sufficient basis for convicting a defendant of a crime unless 
special circumstances were present.”); United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1217 (M.D. Ala. 
2009) (citing Ralph Norman Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing Remembering and Reporting Events, 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1057, 1091–92 (2000)) (“[R]ecommending that eyewitness testimony be 
excluded if . . . there is no corroborating testimony.”). 
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B. Reliance on Traditional Safeguards of Justice 
Courts most often rely on existing trial protections to resolve own-race 
bias, primarily trusting cross-examination and summation.
89
 Courts rely 
on these protections because cross-examination and summation conserves 
judicial resources. The increased time and expense of summation or cross-
examination are de minimis, as cross-examination and summation are 
already available during trial. Additionally, cross-examination and 
summation avoid unnecessary focus on race in situations where it is 
supposed inapplicable, as traditional safeguards for defendants are only 
available when an issue has already been raised on direct examination.
90
  
Critical Race Theorists argue that, due to ordinariness, traditional 
safeguards do not prevent cross-racial misidentifications. Juries are simply 
not aware of the unreliability of cross-racial identifications, and traditional 
safeguards do little to educate them.
91
 To resolve own-race bias 
 
 
 89. See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 209, 214 (“Traditionally, cross-examination has been the only 
method available for defense counsel to expose these considerations . . . [A] defendant is usually left 
with only cross-examination, closing argument and summation to address the issue [of faulty 
eyewitness identification]” and “The adversarial system has traditionally relied upon cross-
examination as a mechanism to alert the jury to any inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the testimony of 
an eyewitness and, when coupled with proper cautionary instructions regarding eyewitness testimony, 
the jury is presumed to be able to assess the credibility and reliability of each witness.”); see also Chiu, 
supra note 28, at 421 (“Traditionally, cross-examination was one of the only available methods in 
many jurisdictions that allowed the defense to expose issues of cross-racial identification.”). Other 
common protections of the court system include voir dire (the process of jury selection), suppression 
hearings, and traditional jury instructions, which not only ignore the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony generally but do not indicate the increased inaccuracies of cross-racial identifications. See 
Aaronson, supra note 30. 
 90. See State v. Smith, 880 A.2d 288, 300 (Md. 2005) (holding defense entitled to address the 
difficulty of cross-racial identifications where witness held herself out as being “extremely good with 
faces.”); see also Chiu, supra note 28, at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Courts . . . may 
prohibit the defense from mentioning the difficulties of cross-racial identification because they deem it 
racially inflammatory. Additionally, there may also be a lack of factual foundation for such arguments 
as both defense attorneys and prosecutors are limited to arguments of facts in evidence or inferences 
from those facts.”). 
 91. See also Gee, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 29, at 844–45 (“[S]uppression hearings, 
cross-examinations and closing arguments, the three traditional protections against erroneous 
identifications, fail to adequately protect against cross-racial recognition impairment. . . . Although 
cross-examination can test veracity and probe sources of unreliability, it is unlikely to reveal cross-
racial recognition impairment.”). Cross-examination is especially futile largely because “there is no 
known and commonly understood correlation for the own-race effect . . . [thus] cross-examination will 
never illicit facts from which the jury can infer the impairment.” Id. at 845; see also Chiu, supra note 
28, at 421–22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[R]esearch indicates that [cross-examination] may 
not be as effective as intended. While this approach may call into question the reliability of eyewitness 
identification, it is unclear whether jurors’ decisions are improved as a result. In addition, cross-
examination proves to be ineffective if the eyewitness believes that he or she has a good memory of 
faces of other races.”). 
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disparities, courts must realize that “the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications cannot be adequately questioned through either cross-
examination or closing argument and . . . that jurors are not capable of 
understanding apparent indicia of reliability without the aid of [other 
protections].”
92
 Research studies performed through mock trials have 
shown that, even when eyewitnesses are cross-examined in front of the 
jury by skilled trial attorneys, jurors are unable to differentiate between 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.
93
  
Further, for cross-examination and summation to be reliable tools, the 
defense attorney must be knowledgeable regarding the unreliability of 
cross-racial examinations.
94
 This is, sadly, not the case. “Lawyers are 
subject to the same misconceptions about [witness] evaluation as lay 
jurors . . . [and] are unlikely to appreciate the dangers inherent particularly 
in cross-racial [witness] evaluation.”
95
 In rejecting the traditional 
safeguards of justice as a tool to alleviate own-race bias, critical race 
theorists would note that race discrimination “is ordinary, not aberrational 
. . . the usual way society does business, the common, everyday experience 
 
 
 Additionally, defense counsel must avoid reemphasizing an erroneous identification. Juries often 
base their determination of witness reliability on the confidence of the witness, regardless of 
influencing factors such as own-race bias. See id. at 415. Defense counsel may be hesitant to cross-
examine even if the witness is inaccurate as “[a] witness can bolster her credibility with regard to 
people recognition, and the jurors thus may be influenced to credit the witness with greater reliability 
than they may have been inclined to credit before.” Id. at 430.  
 This is not to say that traditional safeguards are never effective. Cross-examination can at times be 
used to parse out whether an identification is unreliable based on own-race bias, such as in Janey v. 
State, 891 A.2d 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), where the witness expressly stated that he had trouble 
identifying African Americans. See Chiu, supra note 28, at 430 (discussing Janey v. State). In such a 
case, “where the eyewitness testimony is not the sole charging evidence and the witness has already 
volunteered that the identification may not be reliable, the defense counsel has adequate means to 
protect itself from inaccurate testimony.” Id. However, as addressed previously, inaccurate cross-racial 
identifications are rarely this apparent at trial. See Aaronson, supra note 30. Closing arguments are just 
as futile, as “jurors may feel pressured to ignore even the most persuasive arguments addressing cross-
racial identifications because of a lack of testimony or other evidence supporting such claims.” Chiu, 
supra note 28, at 431. 
 92. Rutledge, supra note 2, at 215–16 (“Scholars are arguing in increasing numbers that evidence 
suggests “the use of special judicial instructions that focus on factors known to influence eyewitness 
identifications . . . [to] assist jurors with their judgments by providing information that is not within 
their commonsense knowledge.”). 
 93. See Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 22–23; see also Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 7 
(“Traditional trial protections . . . do not adequately address the special recognition impairments often 
present in cross-racial eyewitness identifications . . . [M]uch of the reason for juries’ erroneous 
convictions based on faulty eyewitness identifications is that jurors are not very sensitive to the factors 
that determine eyewitness accuracy.”). 
 94. See Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 23 (“[I]n order to effectively cross-examine, the attorney 
would need to have the opportunity to identify the factors that were likely to affect the identification, 
be aware of their influence, and be able to inform the judge and jury of these effects.”). 
 95. Rand, supra note 3, at 74. 
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of most people of color in this country.”
96
 Adhering to the current 
protections is the very definition of “business as usual,” and perpetuates 
the failure of the courts to address the racial disparities created by own-
race bias.
97
 
C. Expert Testimony 
Many scholars have supported the allowance of expert testimony 
regarding the effects of own-race bias in cases involving a cross-racial 
identification. Expert testimony is the best educational tool for the jury, 
adequately informing laypersons of the frailty of cross-racial 
identifications.
98
 The American Bar Association, for this reason, 
propagated expert testimony as a potential remedy to alleviate own-race 
bias.
99
 Beyond the educational benefits, researchers have noted that 
“[j]urors are more apt to comfortably discuss racial differences without 
fear of discord in the jury room when they have received testimony from 
an expert considering the possible influence of racial differences as 
affecting the accuracy of the identification.”
100
 While expert testimony is 
highly touted by academia though, few courts have permitted, or are likely 
to permit, this solution.
101
  
Courts argue that “the reliability of eyewitness identification is within 
the knowledge of jurors and expert testimony generally would not assist 
them.”
102
 Aside from this erroneous belief, the use of expert testimony 
 
 
 96. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 7. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 3 (“[I]f a jury is to be given any information about the cross-
racial nature of the identification, an expert witness is preferable to a cross-racial jury instruction.”). 
 99. The American Bar Association noted that it is “crucial to the deliberative process that jurors 
are educated on the potential errors in cross-racial identifications.” Id. at 15. While realistically there 
are resource and access problems to the use of expert testimony, “[t]he Committee [on cross-racial 
identification impairment] supports the use of expert testimony where resources are available.” Id. at 3. 
See also Brodes v. State, 551 S.E.2d 757, 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that expert testimony 
would have provided necessary assistance to the jury in determining the accuracy of the identification 
where the victim testimony included cross-racial identifications made while at gunpoint). 
 100. Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 15. 
 101. See Chiu, supra note 28, at 421 (“[M]any courts reject expert psychological testimony as a 
superfluous attempt to put the gloss of expertise, like a bit of frosting, upon inferences which lay 
persons were equally capable of drawing from the evidence.”); see also Rutledge, supra note 2, at 215 
(“[E]xpert testimony has not been warmly received by the judiciary.”). 
 102. See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 219 (citing State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1114 (Conn. 
1999)); see also State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 463–64 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to allow expert 
testimony because difficulty in accurately identifying members of another race is a “commonsense 
view”); see also Lindo, supra note 15, at 1252 (“The [Cromedy] court specifically disallowed expert 
testimony because of the widely held commonsense view that members of one race have greater 
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raises valid practical concerns, including problems of access and allocation 
of judicial resources. While beneficial in theory, expert testimony is 
impractical because “only a relatively small number of persons [are] 
qualified to testify as an expert . . . on cross-racial identifications in the 
United States.”
103
 Even where experts are accessible, few individuals can 
afford the additional trial costs that would be incurred by including such 
testimony. The average cost of non-medical expert testimony is $248 per 
hour, without including other expenses such as witness preparation, travel 
costs, etc.
104
 Addressing own-race bias is most important in criminal 
cases, where the potential consequences of an erroneous identification are 
a criminal record, incarceration, and worse. The majority of people 
accused of criminal conduct, though, are indigent, unable to afford experts 
to testify on their behalf.
105
 The courts are in no better position to assist. 
Due to lean state judicial budgets, “[t]here is insufficient funding to 
provide expert witnesses to most indigent defendants who need them, 
especially when there is a problem in many States of having adequate 
funds to pay attorneys [to] represent the indigent accused.”
106
 Courts are 
also wary that experts will subsume the role of the jury, with jurors 
regarding expert testimony as fact, rather than skilled opinion.
107
 Expert 
testimony regarding the faulty nature of cross-racial identifications risks 
overcompensating for own-race bias, persuading the jury to disbelieve an 
accurate witness where race played no part in the identification.
108
  
 
 
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race thus concluding that expert testimony 
on the topic would not assist the jury in any meaningful way.”). Interestingly, the court in Cromedy 
took note of the debate between researchers regarding own-race bias in eyewitness identifications, 
seemingly contradicting their own assertion that the own-race bias was a “widely held commonsense 
view.” Id. at 1253–53. 
 103. Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 3 (“Council recently stated that there are less than a handful of 
such experts in Los Angeles, California, and that no expert witnesses are available in many rural 
areas.”). 
 104. Expert Witness Fee Study, SEAK, INC. (2004), http://www.seak.com/expert-witness-fee-
study/.  
 105. See Rutledge, supra note 2. 
 106. Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 15 (“[E]xperts may be costly, confuse the jury rather than clarify 
the issues, and take up time.”); see also Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 154 (Mass. 
2004) (denying motion for funding for an eyewitness identification expert due to the “expense given 
the questionable admissibility of this type of evidence.”). 
 107. See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 219 (“The Second Circuit holds that expert psychological 
testimony likely usurps the jury’s role of determining witness credibility.”). Because expert testimony 
focuses on the potential errors in eyewitness, many attorneys have argued that such testimony is 
necessarily more prejudicial than probative, and should therefore be excluded. See id. at 222; see also 
Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
 108. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 4 (“[I]t is impossible to know in an individual case whether 
the cross-racial identification actually had an effect on the identification.”); see also Donnelly, supra 
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Due to the overwhelming opposition of the judiciary, this method is an 
unrealistic solution.
109
 In addition to judicial opposition, expert testimony 
continues to be subject to significant discretionary barriers of entry 
through the Federal Rules of Evidence.
110
 As it currently stands, “expert 
testimony may never become widely accepted because it carries with it an 
aura of reform, and reform in the criminal justice system will always be 
resisted.”
111
 
D. Cautionary Jury Instructions 
Perhaps the “most productive thing the defense can do is obtain 
cautionary instructions about identification evidence that will alert jurors 
to potential problems and provide a guide to evaluating the evidence.”
112
 
Critical race theorists support cautionary instructions as a viable solution 
because they alert jurors to own-race bias and resolve, at least partially, the 
ordinariness of cross-racial identifications. While conceding that this 
solution is not as informative as expert testimony, jury instructions do not 
implicate the concerns that hamper expert testimony and are therefore 
more likely to be adopted by the judiciary.
113
 In the absence of a better 
tool, cautionary instructions still allow defense counsel to educate jurors 
and, in contrast to cross examination, can be issued even if race was not 
raised on direct examination.
114
 A cautionary instruction, most 
 
 
note 39, at 364 (“[The] primary concerns [in admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identifications] 
are that there is no description of which factors would be relevant, no definition of ‘races,’ and no 
legal analysis of whether the findings of this scientific research is [sic] credible enough to be 
admissible in court.”). 
 109. See Chiu, supra note 28, at 429–30 (“Of the four remedies . . . expert testimony is the least 
likely [to be allowed].”). 
 110. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 (restricting use of expert testimony in federal trials). 
 111. Rutledge, supra note 2, at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Savage & 
Devendorf, supra note 32, at 31 (2011) (“Although expert testimony is probably the most effective 
way to educate jurors about eyewitness identification issues, many courts will not allow such 
testimony, or will strictly limit it to specific topics.”).  
 112. Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 30 (“Viable instructions are evolving in some 
jurisdictions that are starting to recognize the developed body of scientific evidence about eyewitness 
identification.”). 
 113. Critics will note that in some situations, juries have even been shown to have less sensitivity 
to issues such as cross-racial identification when presented in a jury instruction. See Gee, Justice, 
supra note 12. However, the American Bar Association concluded that cross-racial jury instructions 
ensure “fairness and confidence in the criminal justice system.” Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 16. 
 114. See Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 31; see also K. Suzanne Heisinger, State v. 
Cromedy: 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999), 6 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 155, 160 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (In New Jersey, “trial courts are obligated to provide a jury 
instruction to focus the jury’s attention on how to analyze and consider the trustworthiness of the 
eyewitness identification.”). 
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importantly, enhances the jury’s decision-making ability.
115
 Similar to 
expert testimony, “jurors are more apt to comfortably discuss racial 
differences with [after a cautionary] instruction.”
116
  
Judicially, case-specific jury instructions are gaining acceptance, 
especially in comparison to requests for expert testimony.
117
 There are 
few, if any, resource costs to including an additional jury instruction, and 
courts have not raised any such concerns when opposing their addition. 
Courts have, though, raised subjective concerns, arguing that a jury 
instruction usurps the jury’s ability to determine credibility and allows 
race to improperly determine a trial.
118
 Leading progressive states that 
have addressed these arguments have largely discredited both 
propositions.
119
 Well-written instructions do not direct the jury as to 
whether the witness is or is not credible. Rather, such instructions warn the 
jury that the cross-racial identification is a central issue in the specific case 
and informs the jurors as to what effect own-race bias may play in the 
current witness’s identification.
120
 The determination to apply the 
information presented in the cautionary instruction is still within the 
discretion of the jurors. As jury instructions effectively reconcile the 
judiciary’s concerns with the goals of critical race theory, they are the 
 
 
 115. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (“The jury’s 
decision-making process can be enhanced by learning how these factors combine to impact perception 
and memory.”). 
 116. Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 16 (“[T]he additional safeguard of a jury instruction on cross-
racial identification is an important tool to help protect against the heightened risk of eyewitness 
misidentification and wrongful conviction.”). 
 117. See Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 31 (“In many situations, case-specific cautionary 
instructions may play the same educational role, but may be easier to obtain than expert testimony.”). 
 118. See State v. Walker, 8 A.3d 844, 847 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (holding a cross-racial 
jury instruction was not necessary because, “it might inject some racial aspects to this case which [the 
judge] really did not see at all in any of the testimony from the victim or any of the witnesses.”); see 
also People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (N.Y. 2004) (“Absent a general agreement in the 
scientific community regarding the effects of “own-race” bias . . . expanded jury instruction[s] 
regarding cross-racial identification should not be employed in criminal trials.”); Miller v. State, 759 
N.E.2d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“An instruction directed to the testimony of one witness 
erroneously invades the province of the jury when it intimates an opinion on the credibility of a 
witness or the weight to be given to [her] testimony.”) (quoting Perry v. State, 541 N.E.2d 913, 917 
(Ind. 1989)). 
 119. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (“It is true that some state courts have 
refused to give cautionary instructions on the ground that they constitute improper judicial comment 
. . . or suggest the weight that should be accorded certain testimony. . . . We see little merit to this 
argument.”). 
 120. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“I cannot agree that 
because any discussion of this identification problem necessarily refers to racial differences, such 
discussion is . . . prejudicial and divisive. . . . [A] narrowly drawn instruction dealing with a familiar, 
albeit racial, phenomenon can hardly be equated with a broad appeal to racial prejudice.”). 
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most realistic solution to alleviate own-race bias in cross-racial 
identifications.
121
 
III. DRAFTING A CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION 
As of this writing, cautionary instructions have not been a prevalent 
solution to correcting own-race bias. The few states that do provide pattern 
jury instructions for cross-racial identifications have done so in widely 
varying manners.
122
 A few courts have drafted long, detailed instructions 
specifically addressing own-race bias, while others name cross-racial 
identification in a laundry list of factors that affect eyewitness testimony 
generally.
123
 Some jury instructions are mandatory under specified 
circumstances, such as when the eyewitness identification is 
uncorroborated by other evidence.
124
 Others are permissive, left to the 
discretion of the court in all situations.
125
 In attempting to determine what 
characteristics are most important for a cautionary instruction to carry out 
the goals of critical race theorists, it is imperative to discuss the currently 
existing cross-racial cautionary instructions.  
Section A briefly addresses the cross-racial identification jury 
instructions that have been applied in the District of Columbia, New 
 
 
 121. Courts are most likely to allow cautionary jury instructions, especially in light of the still-
growing body of research surrounding cross-racial identifications, because it is a non-radical, yet 
progressive step in the process of eliminating racial disparities. The Court in State v. Long noted as 
much in declaring, “[s]uch a bold departure [as excluding eyewitness testimony entirely] will have to 
await further empirical evidence that less radical alternatives do not ameliorate the problem. However, 
we do consider ourselves compelled by the overwhelming weight of the empirical research to take 
steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness identification testimony.” Id. (“[A]n 
instruction both respects the jury’s function and strikes a reasonable balance between protecting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty.”).  
 122. Currently only California, Utah, New Jersey, and Massachusetts specifically authorize or 
require a cross-racial identification jury instruction. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 12; see also Chiu, 
supra note 28, at 424 (“Currently, only a handful of jurisdictions have pattern instructions for cross-
racial identification situations. These jurisdictions vary in their approaches to formulating pattern 
instructions. Some jurisdictions include long and detailed instructions, while other jurisdictions only 
include a single line.”). 
 123. Compare United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (appending a 
twelve-paragraph model special instruction on identification) with Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 5 
(discussing the California jury instruction, which “includes the cross-racial instruction in a short 
laundry list of items that may be considered” while primarily focusing on the frailty of eyewitness 
testimony generally) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
 125. See Heisinger, supra note 114, at 160 (“[T]he majority of courts that allow cross-racial 
identification jury instructions have left the decision to provide the instruction to the trial judge’s 
discretion.”); Miller v. State, 759 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“The giving of jury 
instructions is a duty entrusted to the discretion of the court, and the trial court’s decision will not be 
disturbed except where there is an abuse of that discretion.”). 
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Jersey, and Utah, as well as the American Bar Association’s 2008 
proposed model jury instruction. Section B proposes three necessary 
factors of any cautionary instruction to effectively address own-race bias: 
(1) mandatory application in all situations where a cross-racial 
identification is at issue; (2) use of objective language; and 
(3) administration of the cautionary instruction separate from the general 
eyewitness testimony instruction and prior to the testimony which includes 
the cross-racial identification. 
A. The History of Cross-Racial Identification Cautionary Jury 
Instructions 
The first judicial attempt to address own-race bias through a cautionary 
instruction was Judge Bazelon’s 1972 concurrence in United States v. 
Telfaire.
126
 The Telfaire court primarily focused on developing a general 
cautionary instruction emphasizing concerns about the accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony. Judge Bazelon proposed an additional instruction 
focused entirely on cross-racial identification that was ultimately rejected 
by the majority.
127
 Since that time, “[t]he Telfaire instructions, which were 
based on legal precedent, not science, have been . . . criticized” for their 
failure to address factors that have since been scientifically proven to 
affect the reliability of eyewitness identification.
128
 As the science 
surrounding own-race bias has developed, it has become clear that 
“Telfaire-like instructions have little positive effect on juror sensitivity to 
eyewitness identification evidence . . . [and] may even reduce juror 
sensitivity.”
129
  
Despite these criticisms, the outdated Telfaire instruction has continued 
to be one of the most widely utilized cautionary instructions.
130
 There are, 
however, indications that courts are willing to replace the Telfaire 
 
 
 126. See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 559–61 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 561. The Bazelon Instruction reads: 
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race than the defendant. In the experience 
of many it is more difficult to identify members of a different race than members of one's 
own. If this is also your own experience, you may consider it in evaluating the witness's 
testimony. You must also consider, of course, whether there are other factors present in this 
case which overcome any such difficulty of identification. For example, you may conclude 
that the witness has had sufficient contacts with members of the defendant's race that he 
would not have greater difficulty in making a reliable identification. 
Id. 
 128. Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 32. 
 129. Id. at 32 n.40. 
 130. See Brigham et al., supra note 39, at 23. 
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instruction with an improved option if one is developed. In a survey of 52 
judges, 78% felt that the Telfaire instruction is not satisfactory.
131
  
While the easy response would be to adopt the proposed Bazelon 
instruction, Bazelon’s draft also had significant defects. Specifically, the 
Bazelon instruction directed jurors to consider the effects of own-race bias 
only if the juror subjectively believed that own-race bias was their “own 
experience.”
132
 This led many jurors, who did not believe they 
experienced difficulty recognizing members of other races, to 
deemphasize the instruction.
133
 Worse still, the subjective language of that 
instruction, which effectively allows the juror to determine whether or not 
own-race bias exists, leads jurors to falsely assume that own-race bias is 
not scientifically supported. 
In 1994, New Jersey created a task force to study the effects of own-
race bias and propose solutions for the state’s courts to implement.
134
 
After five years of extensive research, the task force concluded that own-
race bias posed a serious problem in New Jersey courts and recommended 
a jury instruction as the preferred corrective measure.
135
 The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey finally had the chance to implement the findings of 
the task force in 1999, in State v. Cromedy.
136
 Expressly citing the task 
force’s findings, the Court proposed a model jury instruction to be applied 
“when eyewitness identification is a central issue and no corroborating 
evidence exists.”
137
  
 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 561 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
 133. See Aaronson, supra note 30, at 5. 
 134. See State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 465–66 (N.J. 1999); see also Heisinger, supra note 114, 
at 160. The Task Force included trial and appellate judges, defense and prosecution attorneys, social 
scientists, laypersons, and consulted with respected legal scholars. Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 465. In 
addition, the task force examined a substantial amount of professional literature on the topic. Id. Aside 
from a single prosecutor, the panel unanimously agreed that the problem of cross-racial identification 
existed within the New Jersey court system and demanded corrective action by the courts. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 465–66. 
 137. Lindo, supra note 15, at 1229; see also Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 32 n.35 (“A 
cross-racial instruction should be given only when . . . identification is a critical issue in the case, and 
an eyewitness’s cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it independent 
reliability.”). The Model Jury Instruction proposed by the New Jersey Task Force reads:  
[T]he fact that an identifying witness is not of the same race as the perpetrator and/or 
defendant, and whether that fact might have had an impact on the accuracy of the witness’ 
original perception, and/or the accuracy of the subsequent identification. You should consider 
that in ordinary human experience, people may have greater difficulty in identifying members 
of a different race.  
See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 6. 
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To its credit, the Cromedy instruction focused solely on cross-racial 
identification and was delivered separate from the general eyewitness 
testimony instruction.
138
 Unfortunately though, the Cromedy court left 
administration of the instruction to the discretion of the court and placed 
significant restrictions on when the instruction was permitted.
139
 The “no-
corroboration” requirement made application of the cautionary instruction 
practically non-existent.
140
 As a result, scholars and activists began 
demanding mandatory application of the instruction almost immediately 
following the decision.
141
 
The Cromedy court, and the New Jersey task force, needed only to 
research Utah’s mandatory cautionary instruction, which had been adopted 
thirteen years prior in State v. Long.
142
 Long made Utah the only state with 
a mandatory jury instruction, to be administered “whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is 
requested by the defense.”
143
 Long’s shortcoming, though, was that it did 
not separate its cross-racial identification instruction from the general 
eyewitness testimony instruction, diminishing the importance and 
visibility of the safeguard.
144
  
The American Bar Association most recently addressed own-race bias 
in an extensive 2008 report, which assessed the jury instructions currently 
in use and drafted a new model cautionary instruction for uniform 
adoption:
145
  
In this case, the identifying witness is of a different race than the 
defendant. You may consider, if you think it is appropriate to do so, 
whether the fact that the defendant is of a different race than the 
witness has affected the accuracy of the witness’ original perception 
or the accuracy of a later identification. You should consider that in 
 
 
 138. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Cf. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (“We have also been advised that this 
Court’s de facto failure to ever require such an instruction has resulted in trial courts rarely, if ever, 
giving cautionary instructions.”). 
 141. See Heisinger, supra note 114, at 162 (“The impact of Cromedy will not be felt unless the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey broadens its holding to require a cross-racial identification charge in 
every case in which cross-racial identification is at issue.”). 
 142. Long, 721 P.2d at 487. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. The relevant portion of the Utah model jury instruction reads: “You should also consider 
whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person of a 
different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same race.” Id. 
 145. See Saltzburg, supra note 22. 
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ordinary human experience, some people may have greater 
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race than 
they do in identifying members of their own race.
146
 
In contrast to the Telfaire instruction, the ABA model correctly 
implemented objective language, emphasizing that “in ordinary human 
experience” individuals generally struggle to accurately identify members 
of a race different than their own.
147
 Despite focused analysis on the topic, 
though, the ABA—like the Cromedy Court—recommended that 
administration of the instruction be left to judicial discretion. The ABA 
overlooked that courts rarely, if ever, administer permissive 
instructions.
148
 
B. Building a Better Model Jury Instruction 
Ordinariness indicates that “racial discrimination is a perpetual legal 
and social problem that has rendered the color-blind principle a 
fallacy.”
149
 Building an optimal jury instruction is a difficult process, as 
exemplified by the varying instructions currently in use.
150
 Critical race 
theory supports a model instruction that “sensitize[s] the jury to the factors 
that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those that laypersons 
most likely would not appreciate,”
151
 such as the fallibility of cross-racial 
identifications. To effectively alert and sensitize the jury to this concern, 
an optimal jury instruction should: (1) be mandatory in all situations in 
which a cross-racial identification is at issue; (2) use objective language; 
and (3) be administered separate from the general eyewitness testimony 
instruction and prior to the testimony which includes the cross-racial 
identification.  
 
 
 146. Id. at 4–5. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 3. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (“We also have been advised that 
this Court’s de facto failure to ever require such an instruction has resulted in trial courts rarely, if 
ever, giving cautionary instructions.”). 
 149. Gee, From Hallway Corridor to Homelessness: Tenants Lack Right to Counsel in New York 
Housing Court, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 87, 95 (2010). 
 150. See Chiu, supra note 28. 
 151. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
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1. An Optimal Cross-Racial Identification Jury Instruction Should be 
Mandatory in All Situations in which a Cross-Racial Identification 
is at Issue 
A cross-racial identification jury instruction should be mandatory in all 
situations where a witness has identified an individual of a different race 
than her own. The Cromedy Court held that a cross-racial jury instruction 
is important where: (1) identification is a central issue in the case; (2) little 
or no corroborating evidence of the identification is presented; and (3) the 
circumstances raise doubt concerning the reliability of the 
identification.
152
 However, researchers have noted that “imposing [a] 
requirement that there be no corroborating evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt . . . severely limit[s] the utility of the cross-racial identification 
instruction.”
153
 An own-race bias instruction should not be limited by 
additional prerequisites such as corroboration. Other cautionary 
instructions are not contingent upon proof of qualifying factors such as 
whether evidence was corroborated.
154
 Cross-racial jury instructions 
should not be treated differently, as they “do no more than apprise the jury 
of the inherent limitations of eyewitness identification.”
155
 The result of 
this and similar obstacles to administration is judicial hypocrisy, as “the 
cross-racial identification instruction is, in theory, a step toward 
counterbalancing the effects of ‘own-race’ bias . . . [while] in practice, the 
court sets forth a standard that is extremely difficult to meet.”
156
  
Aside from legal theory, the corroboration requirement should be 
removed simply as a logical improvement. A thought experiment will be 
helpful. Consider a “no-corroboration” state where one Asian witness 
identifies a Caucasian defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. In this 
scenario, a cross-racial jury instruction would be permitted so long as 
there was no corroborating evidence. However, if two Asian witnesses 
both identified the same Caucasian defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime, a jury instruction would not be available, even if no other 
corroborating evidence existed.
157
 Nonetheless, the existence of a second 
 
 
 152. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 457; see also Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (discussing situations in 
which cautionary instructions are necessary). 
 153. Heisinger, supra note 114, at 161. 
 154. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 4. 
 155. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
 156. Id. Additionally, where corroborating evidence exists, there should be little concern that a 
jury instruction will, on its own, cause the jury to incorrectly find a guilty party innocent. 
 157. Id. 
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eyewitness of a different race than the accused does not resolve the 
inherent own-race bias of both witnesses.  
This hypothetical, unfortunately, is not far from reality. In one case, 
five white victims of a burglary individually identified the same black 
male as their attacker.
158
 After investigation, police determined that the 
accused had not even have been in the victims’ city on the date the crime 
occurred. In fact, the unanimously identified suspect was several hundred 
miles away from the victims’ home at the time of the crime.
159
 Police 
eventually arrested the responsible party; the previously accused and the 
guilty individual had little in common other than having a similar skin 
tone.
160
 The number of witnesses does not affect the individual potential 
for own-race bias in cross-racial identifications.
161
 As such testimony is 
questionable regardless of corroboration, cross-racial identification jury 
instructions must be mandatory whether or not the identification is 
corroborated.
162
  
The Long Court required defense counsel to expressly request the 
cautionary instruction, though this condition should also be avoided in an 
optimal cautionary instruction.
163
 This “ask and you shall receive” 
requirement places the burden of requesting the instruction on the defense 
attorney, and “[t]he jury’s knowledge of the relevant factors should not 
turn on the inadvertence or inexperience of trial counsel”
164
 Rather, the 
jury should be exposed to “all relevant information so that it can decide for 
itself whether race should be considered. . . . By denying many defendants 
this instruction, the court . . . deprives them of their right to a fair trial . . . 
[and] also denies jury members of their right to decide cases based on the 
totality of the circumstances.”
165
 Courts should “either abandon any 
pretext of requiring a cautionary eyewitness instruction or make the 
requirement meaningful.”
166
 An optimal cautionary instruction should be 
 
 
 158. See Chiu, supra note 28, at 417. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Heisinger, supra note 114, at 162 (“If race impairs one’s ability to accurately identify 
members of another race, as the court [in Cromedy] recognized, the mere existence of corroborating 
evidence does not make it less likely that the witness was affected by ‘own race’ bias.”). 
 162. But see Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 3 (“[The ABA Committee] recommends that trial judges 
should have the discretion to give an instruction on cross-racial identification in certain cases where 
there is a heightened risk of misidentification.”). 
 163. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986).  
 164. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 165. Heisinger, supra note 114, at 163. 
 166. Long, 721 P.2d at 487. 
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mandatorily read to the jury, regardless of whether it has been requested 
by counsel. 
2. An Optimal Cross-Racial Identification Jury Instruction Should use 
Objective Language 
A cautionary jury instruction should be drafted with objective language 
to prevent jurors from deemphasizing the fallibility of cross-racial 
identifications. Subjective, Telfaire-like instructions tell jurors “that they 
should use their ‘common sense’ in evaluating credibility, even though 
most jurors’ common sense would lead them to focus on the same 
fallacious stereotypical correlates of deception.”
167
 As such, these 
instructions do not effectively communicate the scientific consensus that 
cross-racial identifications are especially inaccurate due to own-race 
bias.
168
  
The Long instruction is a template for effective objective language, as 
it states clearly and succinctly: “[y]ou should also consider whether the 
witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a 
person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race.”
169
 The purpose in adopting a cautionary 
instruction is to educate jurors about the potential unreliability of cross-
racial identifications. It is important that the language persuades jurors to 
set aside commonly held beliefs regarding the accuracy of cross-racial 
identification for the purpose of justice. To confront the ordinary aspects 
of racial discrimination, “[o]nly aggressive, color-conscious efforts to . . . 
will do much to ameliorate [the effects].”
170
 Objective language is 
assertive in alerting jurors to the unreliability of cross-racial identifications 
due to own-race bias and should be used in all cross-racial identification 
jury instructions.  
 
 
 167. Rand, supra note 3, at 72. 
 168. See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 561 (“In the experience of many it is more difficult to identify 
members of a different race than members of one's own. If this is also your own experience, you may 
consider it in evaluating the witness's testimony.”) (emphasis added). 
 169. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986).  
 170. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4, at 26. 
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3. An Optimal Cross-Racial Identification Jury Instruction Should be 
Administered Separate from the General Eyewitness Testimony 
Instruction and Prior to the Testimony which Includes the Cross-
Racial Identification 
Certain procedural measures should be taken to optimize the 
effectiveness of cross-racial identification instructions. Cautionary 
instructions do little to affect the jury’s ability to evaluate a witness if 
given after testimony. The mandatory instruction, therefore, should be 
read “before eyewitness evidence is presented so that [the jurors] have the 
relevant factors in mind while listening to the testimony.”
171
  
Additionally, the cautionary instruction should be separate and unique 
from the general eyewitness testimony instruction. According to 
ordinariness, the instruction must specifically highlight race to effectuate 
any significant change in the discriminatory pattern of the judicial 
system.
172
 Unlike the Long instruction, which included a sentence on 
cross-racial identification within a larger, general eyewitness testimony 
instruction, or the California instruction, which included “cross-racial 
identification” in a laundry list of eyewitness accuracy factors, an optimal 
cautionary instruction should be administered individually.
173
 This 
requires legislatures or judges to draft a unique cross-racial identification 
jury instruction that specifically addresses the unreliability of such 
identifications due to own-race bias. In this manner, the Cromedy 
instruction is an excellent template and should be followed in drafting a 
better model instruction of a short, succinct, and exclusive cross-racial 
identification jury instruction that is separate from the general eyewitness 
testimony instruction.
174
 
CONCLUSION 
“When [the] loss of liberty and [life] . . . are at stake, the additional 
safeguard of a jury instruction on cross-racial identification . . . is an 
important tool to help protect against the heightened risk of eyewitness 
 
 
 171. Savage & Devendorf, supra note 32, at 31; see also Aaronson, supra note 30, at 2 
(“[I]nstructions addressing the enhanced risk of cross-racial misidentification should be given after the 
general instructions regarding identification and credibility of witnesses so that jurors have the means 
to evaluate the accuracy of the identification.”). 
 172. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 4. 
 173. See Long, 721 P.2d at 487; Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 5. 
 174. See State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999). 
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misidentification and wrongful conviction.”
175
 To resolve the ordinariness 
of own-race bias, juries must be directly and effectively educated on the 
inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications. Cautionary jury instructions 
inform the jury of the growing legion of scientific studies verifying the 
negative impact of own-race bias on eyewitness accuracy. Cautionary jury 
instructions neither deplete judicial resources nor subsume the role of the 
jury in assessing the credibility of witnesses at trial. And while courts are 
hesitant to address race in the courtroom, a jury instruction opens the door 
for jurors to consider and discuss race during deliberation with less fear of 
stereotyping or bigotry. Academically, cross-racial identification jury 
instructions allow social scientists and the judiciary to enhance their 
studies of own-race bias and its effects, and “[p]erhaps, over time, the 
lessons of experience will demonstrate the inherent superiority of one type 
or form of cautionary instruction.”
176
 Most importantly, a well-written 
cross-racial identification jury instruction has the potential to keep an 
innocent individual from being wrongfully convicted of a crime they did 
not commit. 
 
 
 175. Aaronson, supra note 30, at 7. 
 176. Long, 721 P.2d at 494–45. 
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